Financial Reporting And Analysis, 7th Edition Solution Manual
Financial Reporting And Analysis, 7th Edition Solution Manual helps you grasp fundamental concepts with detailed textbook-based explanations.
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Financial Reporting and Analysis (7th Ed.)
Chapter 1 Solutions
The Economic and Institutional Setting for Financial Reporting
Problems
Problems
P1-1. Demand for accounting information (LO 1-1)
Requirement 1:
a) Existing shareholders use financial accounting information as part of
their ongoing investment decisions—should more shares of common or
preferred stock be purchased, should some shares be sold, or should current
holdings be maintained? Financial statements help investors assess the
expected risk and return from owning a company’s common and preferred
stock. They are especially useful for investors who adopt a “fundamental
analysis” approach.
Shareholders also use financial accounting information to decide how to vote
on corporate matters like who should be elected to the board of directors,
whether a particular management compensation plan should be approved,
and if the company should merge with or acquire another company. Acting on
behalf of shareholders, the Board of Directors hires and fires the company’s
top executives. Financial statement information helps shareholders and the
board assess the performance of company executives. Dismissals of top
executives often occur following a period of deteriorating financial
performance.
b) Financial statement information helps prospective (potential) investors
identify stocks consistent with their preferences for risk, return, dividend yield,
and liquidity. Here too, financial statements are especially useful for those
investors that adopt a “fundamental approach.”
c) Financial analysts demand accounting information because it is essential
for their jobs. Equity (stock) and credit (debt) analysts provide a wide range of
services ranging from producing summary reports and recommendations
about companies and their securities to actively managing portfolios for
investors that prefer to delegate buying and selling decisions to professionals.
Analysts rely on information about the economy, individual industries, and
particular companies when providing these services. As a group, analysts
constitute probably the largest single source of demand for financial
accounting information—without it, their jobs would be difficult, if not
impossible, to do effectively.
Chapter 1 Solutions
The Economic and Institutional Setting for Financial Reporting
Problems
Problems
P1-1. Demand for accounting information (LO 1-1)
Requirement 1:
a) Existing shareholders use financial accounting information as part of
their ongoing investment decisions—should more shares of common or
preferred stock be purchased, should some shares be sold, or should current
holdings be maintained? Financial statements help investors assess the
expected risk and return from owning a company’s common and preferred
stock. They are especially useful for investors who adopt a “fundamental
analysis” approach.
Shareholders also use financial accounting information to decide how to vote
on corporate matters like who should be elected to the board of directors,
whether a particular management compensation plan should be approved,
and if the company should merge with or acquire another company. Acting on
behalf of shareholders, the Board of Directors hires and fires the company’s
top executives. Financial statement information helps shareholders and the
board assess the performance of company executives. Dismissals of top
executives often occur following a period of deteriorating financial
performance.
b) Financial statement information helps prospective (potential) investors
identify stocks consistent with their preferences for risk, return, dividend yield,
and liquidity. Here too, financial statements are especially useful for those
investors that adopt a “fundamental approach.”
c) Financial analysts demand accounting information because it is essential
for their jobs. Equity (stock) and credit (debt) analysts provide a wide range of
services ranging from producing summary reports and recommendations
about companies and their securities to actively managing portfolios for
investors that prefer to delegate buying and selling decisions to professionals.
Analysts rely on information about the economy, individual industries, and
particular companies when providing these services. As a group, analysts
constitute probably the largest single source of demand for financial
accounting information—without it, their jobs would be difficult, if not
impossible, to do effectively.
Financial Reporting and Analysis (7th Ed.)
Chapter 1 Solutions
The Economic and Institutional Setting for Financial Reporting
Problems
Problems
P1-1. Demand for accounting information (LO 1-1)
Requirement 1:
a) Existing shareholders use financial accounting information as part of
their ongoing investment decisions—should more shares of common or
preferred stock be purchased, should some shares be sold, or should current
holdings be maintained? Financial statements help investors assess the
expected risk and return from owning a company’s common and preferred
stock. They are especially useful for investors who adopt a “fundamental
analysis” approach.
Shareholders also use financial accounting information to decide how to vote
on corporate matters like who should be elected to the board of directors,
whether a particular management compensation plan should be approved,
and if the company should merge with or acquire another company. Acting on
behalf of shareholders, the Board of Directors hires and fires the company’s
top executives. Financial statement information helps shareholders and the
board assess the performance of company executives. Dismissals of top
executives often occur following a period of deteriorating financial
performance.
b) Financial statement information helps prospective (potential) investors
identify stocks consistent with their preferences for risk, return, dividend yield,
and liquidity. Here too, financial statements are especially useful for those
investors that adopt a “fundamental approach.”
c) Financial analysts demand accounting information because it is essential
for their jobs. Equity (stock) and credit (debt) analysts provide a wide range of
services ranging from producing summary reports and recommendations
about companies and their securities to actively managing portfolios for
investors that prefer to delegate buying and selling decisions to professionals.
Analysts rely on information about the economy, individual industries, and
particular companies when providing these services. As a group, analysts
constitute probably the largest single source of demand for financial
accounting information—without it, their jobs would be difficult, if not
impossible, to do effectively.
Chapter 1 Solutions
The Economic and Institutional Setting for Financial Reporting
Problems
Problems
P1-1. Demand for accounting information (LO 1-1)
Requirement 1:
a) Existing shareholders use financial accounting information as part of
their ongoing investment decisions—should more shares of common or
preferred stock be purchased, should some shares be sold, or should current
holdings be maintained? Financial statements help investors assess the
expected risk and return from owning a company’s common and preferred
stock. They are especially useful for investors who adopt a “fundamental
analysis” approach.
Shareholders also use financial accounting information to decide how to vote
on corporate matters like who should be elected to the board of directors,
whether a particular management compensation plan should be approved,
and if the company should merge with or acquire another company. Acting on
behalf of shareholders, the Board of Directors hires and fires the company’s
top executives. Financial statement information helps shareholders and the
board assess the performance of company executives. Dismissals of top
executives often occur following a period of deteriorating financial
performance.
b) Financial statement information helps prospective (potential) investors
identify stocks consistent with their preferences for risk, return, dividend yield,
and liquidity. Here too, financial statements are especially useful for those
investors that adopt a “fundamental approach.”
c) Financial analysts demand accounting information because it is essential
for their jobs. Equity (stock) and credit (debt) analysts provide a wide range of
services ranging from producing summary reports and recommendations
about companies and their securities to actively managing portfolios for
investors that prefer to delegate buying and selling decisions to professionals.
Analysts rely on information about the economy, individual industries, and
particular companies when providing these services. As a group, analysts
constitute probably the largest single source of demand for financial
accounting information—without it, their jobs would be difficult, if not
impossible, to do effectively.
d) Managers demand financial accounting information to help them carry out
their responsibilities to shareholders. Financial accounting information is used
by managers to assess the profitability and health of individual business units
and the company as a whole. Their compensation often depends on financial
statement numbers like earnings per share, return on equity, return on capital
employed, sales growth, and so on. Managers often use a competitor’s
financial statements to benchmark profit performance, cost structures,
financial health, capabilities, and strategies.
e) Current employees demand financial accounting information to monitor
payouts from profit-sharing plans and employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs). Employees also demand financial accounting information to gauge
a company’s long-term viability and the likelihood of continued employment,
as well as payouts under company-sponsored pension and health-care
programs. Unionized employees have other reasons to demand financial
statements, and those are described in Requirement 2 which follows.
f) Lenders use financial accounting information to help determine the
principal amount, interest rate, term, and collateral required on loans they
make. Loan agreements often contain covenants that require a company to
maintain minimum levels of various accounting ratios. Because covenant
compliance is measured by accounting ratios, lenders demand financial
accounting information so they can monitor the borrower’s compliance with
loan terms.
g) Suppliers demand financial accounting information about current and
potential customers to determine whether to grant credit, and on what terms.
The incentive to monitor a customer’s financial condition and operating
performance does not end after the initial credit decision. Suppliers monitor
the financial condition of their customers to ensure that they are paid for the
products, materials, and services they sell.
h) Debt-rating agencies like Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s help lenders and
investors assess the default risk of debt securities offered for sale. Rating
agencies need financial accounting information to evaluate the level and
volatility of the company’s expected future cash flows.
i) Taxing authorities (one type of government regulatory agency) use
financial accounting information as a basis for establishing tax policies.
Companies or industries that appear to be earning “excessive” profits may be
targeted for special taxes or higher tax rates. Keep in mind, however, that
taxing authorities in the United States and many other countries are allowedto
set their own accounting rules. These tax accounting rules, and not GAAP,
determine a company’s taxable income.
Other government agencies are often customers of the company. In this
setting, financial information can serve to help resolve contractual disputes
their responsibilities to shareholders. Financial accounting information is used
by managers to assess the profitability and health of individual business units
and the company as a whole. Their compensation often depends on financial
statement numbers like earnings per share, return on equity, return on capital
employed, sales growth, and so on. Managers often use a competitor’s
financial statements to benchmark profit performance, cost structures,
financial health, capabilities, and strategies.
e) Current employees demand financial accounting information to monitor
payouts from profit-sharing plans and employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs). Employees also demand financial accounting information to gauge
a company’s long-term viability and the likelihood of continued employment,
as well as payouts under company-sponsored pension and health-care
programs. Unionized employees have other reasons to demand financial
statements, and those are described in Requirement 2 which follows.
f) Lenders use financial accounting information to help determine the
principal amount, interest rate, term, and collateral required on loans they
make. Loan agreements often contain covenants that require a company to
maintain minimum levels of various accounting ratios. Because covenant
compliance is measured by accounting ratios, lenders demand financial
accounting information so they can monitor the borrower’s compliance with
loan terms.
g) Suppliers demand financial accounting information about current and
potential customers to determine whether to grant credit, and on what terms.
The incentive to monitor a customer’s financial condition and operating
performance does not end after the initial credit decision. Suppliers monitor
the financial condition of their customers to ensure that they are paid for the
products, materials, and services they sell.
h) Debt-rating agencies like Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s help lenders and
investors assess the default risk of debt securities offered for sale. Rating
agencies need financial accounting information to evaluate the level and
volatility of the company’s expected future cash flows.
i) Taxing authorities (one type of government regulatory agency) use
financial accounting information as a basis for establishing tax policies.
Companies or industries that appear to be earning “excessive” profits may be
targeted for special taxes or higher tax rates. Keep in mind, however, that
taxing authorities in the United States and many other countries are allowedto
set their own accounting rules. These tax accounting rules, and not GAAP,
determine a company’s taxable income.
Other government agencies are often customers of the company. In this
setting, financial information can serve to help resolve contractual disputes
between the company and its customer (the agency) including claims that the
company is earning excessive profits. Financial accounting information can
also be used to determine if the company is financially strong enough to
deliver the ordered goods and services.
Financial accounting information is also used in rate-making deliberations
and monitoring of regulated monopolies such as public utilities.
Requirement 2:
Student responses will vary, but examples are shareholder activist groups
(CalPERS), labor unions, and customers.
Shareholder activist groups demand financial accounting information to
help determine how well the company’s current management team is
doing, and whether the managers are being paid appropriately.
Labor unions demand financial accounting information to help formulate or
improve their bargaining positions with employer companies. Union
negotiators may use financial statements showing sustained or improved
profitability as evidence that employee wages and benefits should be
increased.
Customers demand financial accounting information to help determine if
the company will be able to deliver the product on a timely basis and
provide product support after delivery.
company is earning excessive profits. Financial accounting information can
also be used to determine if the company is financially strong enough to
deliver the ordered goods and services.
Financial accounting information is also used in rate-making deliberations
and monitoring of regulated monopolies such as public utilities.
Requirement 2:
Student responses will vary, but examples are shareholder activist groups
(CalPERS), labor unions, and customers.
Shareholder activist groups demand financial accounting information to
help determine how well the company’s current management team is
doing, and whether the managers are being paid appropriately.
Labor unions demand financial accounting information to help formulate or
improve their bargaining positions with employer companies. Union
negotiators may use financial statements showing sustained or improved
profitability as evidence that employee wages and benefits should be
increased.
Customers demand financial accounting information to help determine if
the company will be able to deliver the product on a timely basis and
provide product support after delivery.
P1-2. Incentives for voluntary disclosure (LO 1-3)
Requirement 1:
a) Companies compete with one another for financial capital in debt and
equity markets. They want to obtain financing at the lowest possible cost. If
investors are unsure about the “quality” of a company’s debt and equity
securities—the risks and returns of investment—they will demand a lower
price (higher rate of return) than would otherwise be the case. Companies
have incentives to voluntarily provide information that allows investors and
lenders to assess the expected risk and return of each security. Failing to do
so means lenders may charge a higher rate of interest for the added
informational risk, and stock investors will give the company less cash for its
common or preferred stock.
b) Companies compete with one another for talented managers and
employees. Information about a company’s past financial performance, its
current health, and its prospects is useful to current and potential employees
who are interested in knowing about long-term employment opportunities,
present and future salary and benefit levels, and advancement opportunities
at the company. To attract the best talent, companies have incentives to
provide financial information that allows prospective managers and
employees to assess the risk and potential rewards of employment.
c) Companies and their managers also compete with one another in the
“market for corporate control.” Here companies make offers to buy or merge
with other companies. Managers of companies that are the target of a friendly
merger or tender offer—a deal they want done—have incentives to disclose
information that raises the bid price. Examples include forecasts of increased
sales and earnings growth. Managers of companies that are the target of
unfriendly (hostile) offers—deals they don’t want done—have incentives to
disclose information that shows the company is best left in the hands of
current management. Hostile bidders often put a different spin on the same
financial information, arguing that it shows just how poorly current
management has run the company.
Requirement 1:
a) Companies compete with one another for financial capital in debt and
equity markets. They want to obtain financing at the lowest possible cost. If
investors are unsure about the “quality” of a company’s debt and equity
securities—the risks and returns of investment—they will demand a lower
price (higher rate of return) than would otherwise be the case. Companies
have incentives to voluntarily provide information that allows investors and
lenders to assess the expected risk and return of each security. Failing to do
so means lenders may charge a higher rate of interest for the added
informational risk, and stock investors will give the company less cash for its
common or preferred stock.
b) Companies compete with one another for talented managers and
employees. Information about a company’s past financial performance, its
current health, and its prospects is useful to current and potential employees
who are interested in knowing about long-term employment opportunities,
present and future salary and benefit levels, and advancement opportunities
at the company. To attract the best talent, companies have incentives to
provide financial information that allows prospective managers and
employees to assess the risk and potential rewards of employment.
c) Companies and their managers also compete with one another in the
“market for corporate control.” Here companies make offers to buy or merge
with other companies. Managers of companies that are the target of a friendly
merger or tender offer—a deal they want done—have incentives to disclose
information that raises the bid price. Examples include forecasts of increased
sales and earnings growth. Managers of companies that are the target of
unfriendly (hostile) offers—deals they don’t want done—have incentives to
disclose information that shows the company is best left in the hands of
current management. Hostile bidders often put a different spin on the same
financial information, arguing that it shows just how poorly current
management has run the company.
Requirement 2:
Student responses will vary, but here are some examples:
Competitive forces from within the industry (i.e., other firms in the industry
are voluntarily disclosing information about order backlogs, customer
turnover, or other key performance indicators).
Demands by financial analysts for expanded or increased disclosure by
the firm.
Demands by shareholder activist groups such as CalPERS.
Demands by debt rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard &
Poor’s.
Pressure from governmental regulatory agencies such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Firms may believe that disclosing certain
information voluntarily may prevent the Securities and Exchange
Commission from mandating more detailed disclosures at a later date.
Demands from institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds, pension funds,
insurance companies, etc.) that hold the company’s securities.
Requirement 3:
The following examples are press release items that could be disclosed
voluntarily: forecasts of current quarter or annual earnings; forecasts of
current quarter or annual sales; forecasts of earnings growth for the next 3 to
5 years; forecasts of sales growth for the next 3 to 5 years; capital
expenditure plans or budgets; research and development plans or budgets;
new product developments; patent applications and awards; changes in top
management; details of corporate restructurings, spin-offs, reorganizations,
plans to discontinue various divisions and/or lines-of-business;
announcements of corporate acquisitions and/or divestitures; announcements
of new debt and/or equity offerings; and announcements of short-term
financing arrangements such as lines of credit. Other student responses are
possible.
The advantage of releasing such information in press releases is that the
news is made available to external parties on a far more timely basis than if
disclosure occurred in quarterly or annual financial statements. Press
releases also give management an opportunity to help shape how the facts
are interpreted.
Student responses will vary, but here are some examples:
Competitive forces from within the industry (i.e., other firms in the industry
are voluntarily disclosing information about order backlogs, customer
turnover, or other key performance indicators).
Demands by financial analysts for expanded or increased disclosure by
the firm.
Demands by shareholder activist groups such as CalPERS.
Demands by debt rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard &
Poor’s.
Pressure from governmental regulatory agencies such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Firms may believe that disclosing certain
information voluntarily may prevent the Securities and Exchange
Commission from mandating more detailed disclosures at a later date.
Demands from institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds, pension funds,
insurance companies, etc.) that hold the company’s securities.
Requirement 3:
The following examples are press release items that could be disclosed
voluntarily: forecasts of current quarter or annual earnings; forecasts of
current quarter or annual sales; forecasts of earnings growth for the next 3 to
5 years; forecasts of sales growth for the next 3 to 5 years; capital
expenditure plans or budgets; research and development plans or budgets;
new product developments; patent applications and awards; changes in top
management; details of corporate restructurings, spin-offs, reorganizations,
plans to discontinue various divisions and/or lines-of-business;
announcements of corporate acquisitions and/or divestitures; announcements
of new debt and/or equity offerings; and announcements of short-term
financing arrangements such as lines of credit. Other student responses are
possible.
The advantage of releasing such information in press releases is that the
news is made available to external parties on a far more timely basis than if
disclosure occurred in quarterly or annual financial statements. Press
releases also give management an opportunity to help shape how the facts
are interpreted.
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P1-3. Costs of disclosure (LO 1-3)
Requirement 1:
a) Information costs include costs to obtain, gather, collate, maintain,
summarize, and communicate financial statement data to external users.
Examples are the cost of computer hardware and software, fees paid to audit
financial statement data, salaries and wages paid to corporate accounting
staff in charge of the firm’s financial accounting system, and costs to print and
mail annual reports to shareholders or make them available electronically on
the company’s web site.
b) Competitive disadvantage costs occur when competitors are able to use
the information in ways detrimental to the company. Examples include
highlighting highly profitable products and services or geographical areas,
technological innovations, new markets or product development plans, and
pricing or advertising strategies.
c) Litigation costs are costs to defend the company against actions brought
by shareholder and creditor lawsuits. These suits claim that previous
information about the company’s operating performance and health was
misleading, false, or not disclosed in a timely manner. Examples include the
direct costs paid to lawyers to defend against the suits, liability insurance
costs, loss of reputation, the productive time lost by managers and
employees as they prepare to defend themselves and the company against
the suit.
d) Political costs arise when, for example, regulators and politicians use
profit levels to argue that a company is earning excessive profits. Regulators
and politicians advance their own interests by proposing taxes on the
company or industry in an attempt to reduce the level of “excessive”
profitability. These taxes represent a wealth transfer from the company’s
shareholders to other sectors of the economy. Managers of companies in
politically sensitive industries sometimes adopt financial reporting practices
that reduce the level of reported profitability to avoid potential political costs.
Requirement 2:
Student responses to this question may vary. One possible cost is when
disclosure commits managers to a course of action that is not optimal for the
company. For example, suppose a company discloses earnings and sales
growth rate goals for a new product or market. If these projections become
unreachable, managers may drop selling prices, offer “easy” credit terms, or
overspend on advertising in an attempt to achieve the sales and earnings
growth goals.
Requirement 1:
a) Information costs include costs to obtain, gather, collate, maintain,
summarize, and communicate financial statement data to external users.
Examples are the cost of computer hardware and software, fees paid to audit
financial statement data, salaries and wages paid to corporate accounting
staff in charge of the firm’s financial accounting system, and costs to print and
mail annual reports to shareholders or make them available electronically on
the company’s web site.
b) Competitive disadvantage costs occur when competitors are able to use
the information in ways detrimental to the company. Examples include
highlighting highly profitable products and services or geographical areas,
technological innovations, new markets or product development plans, and
pricing or advertising strategies.
c) Litigation costs are costs to defend the company against actions brought
by shareholder and creditor lawsuits. These suits claim that previous
information about the company’s operating performance and health was
misleading, false, or not disclosed in a timely manner. Examples include the
direct costs paid to lawyers to defend against the suits, liability insurance
costs, loss of reputation, the productive time lost by managers and
employees as they prepare to defend themselves and the company against
the suit.
d) Political costs arise when, for example, regulators and politicians use
profit levels to argue that a company is earning excessive profits. Regulators
and politicians advance their own interests by proposing taxes on the
company or industry in an attempt to reduce the level of “excessive”
profitability. These taxes represent a wealth transfer from the company’s
shareholders to other sectors of the economy. Managers of companies in
politically sensitive industries sometimes adopt financial reporting practices
that reduce the level of reported profitability to avoid potential political costs.
Requirement 2:
Student responses to this question may vary. One possible cost is when
disclosure commits managers to a course of action that is not optimal for the
company. For example, suppose a company discloses earnings and sales
growth rate goals for a new product or market. If these projections become
unreachable, managers may drop selling prices, offer “easy” credit terms, or
overspend on advertising in an attempt to achieve the sales and earnings
growth goals.
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P1-4. Determining why financial reporting rules differ (LO 1-5)
A country’s financial reporting philosophy evolves from and reflects the
specific legal, political, and financial institutions within the country. External
investors are a much more important source of financial capital in Canada
and the United States than they have historically been in Germany and
Japan. Consequently, financial accounting and reporting standards in
Canada and the U.S. have evolved to meet this public financial market
demand for information—what the chapter describes as the economic
performance approach.
Financial accounting and reporting standards in German and Japan tend to
reflect the commercial and tax law approach described in the chapter. In
Germany and Japan, only a small amount of capital has been provided by
individual investors through public financial markets. The primary source of
capital for German companies has been several large banks—and the
government itself. Labor unions have also played an important corporate
governance role in German companies. Large banks provide much of the
financing in Japan. Along with the German labor unions, these few important
capital providers wield great power including the ability to acquire information
directly from the firm. Because of this concentrated power and the
insignificance of the public financial market in these two countries, financial
reporting standards tend to conform to income tax rules or commercial law.
A country’s financial reporting philosophy evolves from and reflects the
specific legal, political, and financial institutions within the country. External
investors are a much more important source of financial capital in Canada
and the United States than they have historically been in Germany and
Japan. Consequently, financial accounting and reporting standards in
Canada and the U.S. have evolved to meet this public financial market
demand for information—what the chapter describes as the economic
performance approach.
Financial accounting and reporting standards in German and Japan tend to
reflect the commercial and tax law approach described in the chapter. In
Germany and Japan, only a small amount of capital has been provided by
individual investors through public financial markets. The primary source of
capital for German companies has been several large banks—and the
government itself. Labor unions have also played an important corporate
governance role in German companies. Large banks provide much of the
financing in Japan. Along with the German labor unions, these few important
capital providers wield great power including the ability to acquire information
directly from the firm. Because of this concentrated power and the
insignificance of the public financial market in these two countries, financial
reporting standards tend to conform to income tax rules or commercial law.
Loading page 8...
P1-5. Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (LO 1-4)
Requirement 1:
What are generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)? GAAP refers to
the network of conventions, rules, guidelines and procedures that shape the
financial reporting practices of businesses and non-profit organizations. GAAP
comes from two main sources: (1) written pronouncements by designated
standards-setting organizations such as the FASB, IASB and SEC; and (2)
accounting practices that have evolved over time as preparers and auditors
dealt with new business transactions and circumstances not yet described in
written pronouncements. The FASB’s Accounting Standards Codification is
now the sole authoritative source for written GAAP, although suggested
implementation guidelines are provided by industry trade groups and the
AICPA through its various industry guides.
Requirement 2:
Why is GAAP important to independent auditors and to external users?
Independent auditors provide reasonable assurance that the financial
statements of the companies they audit “present fairly, in all material respects”
the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows “in conformity with
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.” It is therefore essential that
independent auditors possess a thorough understanding of GAAP and how it
applies to each specific client.
The goal of GAAP in the United States and most other developed countries is
to ensure that a company’s financial statements represent faithfully its
economic condition and performance. GAAP achieves this goal by providing a
framework for determining when to record a business transaction or event
(recognition), what dollar amount to record (measurement), how summary
information is to be displayed in financial statements (presentation), and what
additional information to provide in the notes (disclosure). External users
benefit when the GAAP framework ensures that the resulting statements and
notes accurately convey information about a company’s true economic
condition and performance.
Requirement 3:
Describe the FASB organization and how it establishes new accounting
standards. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
ultimate legal authority to determine accounting principles in the United States,
it has looked to private-sector organizations to establish these principles.
Today, the private sector standards setting organization is the FASB. It exists
as an independent group with seven full-time members and a large staff.
Board members are appointed for five-year terms and are required to sever all
ties with the companies and institutions they served prior to joining the board.
The FASB follows a “due process” procedure in developing accounting
standards and updates that involves three steps: (1) Discussion-memorandum
stage; (2) Exposure-draft stage; and (3) Voting stage. Public comments on
Requirement 1:
What are generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)? GAAP refers to
the network of conventions, rules, guidelines and procedures that shape the
financial reporting practices of businesses and non-profit organizations. GAAP
comes from two main sources: (1) written pronouncements by designated
standards-setting organizations such as the FASB, IASB and SEC; and (2)
accounting practices that have evolved over time as preparers and auditors
dealt with new business transactions and circumstances not yet described in
written pronouncements. The FASB’s Accounting Standards Codification is
now the sole authoritative source for written GAAP, although suggested
implementation guidelines are provided by industry trade groups and the
AICPA through its various industry guides.
Requirement 2:
Why is GAAP important to independent auditors and to external users?
Independent auditors provide reasonable assurance that the financial
statements of the companies they audit “present fairly, in all material respects”
the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows “in conformity with
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.” It is therefore essential that
independent auditors possess a thorough understanding of GAAP and how it
applies to each specific client.
The goal of GAAP in the United States and most other developed countries is
to ensure that a company’s financial statements represent faithfully its
economic condition and performance. GAAP achieves this goal by providing a
framework for determining when to record a business transaction or event
(recognition), what dollar amount to record (measurement), how summary
information is to be displayed in financial statements (presentation), and what
additional information to provide in the notes (disclosure). External users
benefit when the GAAP framework ensures that the resulting statements and
notes accurately convey information about a company’s true economic
condition and performance.
Requirement 3:
Describe the FASB organization and how it establishes new accounting
standards. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
ultimate legal authority to determine accounting principles in the United States,
it has looked to private-sector organizations to establish these principles.
Today, the private sector standards setting organization is the FASB. It exists
as an independent group with seven full-time members and a large staff.
Board members are appointed for five-year terms and are required to sever all
ties with the companies and institutions they served prior to joining the board.
The FASB follows a “due process” procedure in developing accounting
standards and updates that involves three steps: (1) Discussion-memorandum
stage; (2) Exposure-draft stage; and (3) Voting stage. Public comments on
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discussion memoranda and exposure drafts are invited, and public hearings
are sometimes held.
Requirement 4:
Describe the IASB organization and its role in establishing new accounting
standards. The International Accounting Standards Board, formed in 1973,
works to formulate accounting standards, promote their worldwide acceptance,
and achieve greater convergence of financial reporting regulations, standards,
and procedures across countries. Members are drawn from professional
accounting organizations and businesses around the world.
Requirement 5:
How does the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) influence the
financial reporting practices of U.S. companies? The SEC retains statutory
power over the financial accounting and reporting practices of registrant
companies. This power includes the ability to issue financial accounting and
reporting rules as well as to enforce compliance with the rules it issues or those
issued by standards-setting organizations (e.g., FASB) as designated by the
SEC.
are sometimes held.
Requirement 4:
Describe the IASB organization and its role in establishing new accounting
standards. The International Accounting Standards Board, formed in 1973,
works to formulate accounting standards, promote their worldwide acceptance,
and achieve greater convergence of financial reporting regulations, standards,
and procedures across countries. Members are drawn from professional
accounting organizations and businesses around the world.
Requirement 5:
How does the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) influence the
financial reporting practices of U.S. companies? The SEC retains statutory
power over the financial accounting and reporting practices of registrant
companies. This power includes the ability to issue financial accounting and
reporting rules as well as to enforce compliance with the rules it issues or those
issued by standards-setting organizations (e.g., FASB) as designated by the
SEC.
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P1-6. Relevance versus faithfulrepresentation (LO 1-1)
Requirement 1:
The Blue Book average price is more relevant to the car buying decision than
is the list (or “sticker”) price shown on the manufacturer’s web site. Why?
Because it better represents the price you can expect to pay for the
automobile.
The Blue Book price describes the average price actually paid by recent
buyers for comparably equipped automobiles. Actual prices are the result of
arms-length negotiations between willing buyers and sellers, and thus reflect
what you can expect to pay (on average) when you negotiate your automobile
purchase. The list (“sticker”) price is just a suggested retail price—the actual
negotiated price is often considerably less (but sometimes can be more) than
the manufacturer’s list price.
Requirement 2:
The Blue Book price of $19,500 is less representationally faithful than the
manufacturer’s list price. To understand why, notice that recent selling prices
have ranged from $18,000 to $22,000. This means that while you can expect
to pay $19,500 on average for the automobile, it may cost you as little as
$18,000 or as much as $22,000. On the other hand, there is little (if any)
variation in the manufacturer’s list price—comparably equipped cars have
essentially the same list price.
In this setting, reliability refers to price variation and there is more variation
(less reliability) in the underlying Blue Book prices than there is in the
manufacturer’s list price.
Requirement 1:
The Blue Book average price is more relevant to the car buying decision than
is the list (or “sticker”) price shown on the manufacturer’s web site. Why?
Because it better represents the price you can expect to pay for the
automobile.
The Blue Book price describes the average price actually paid by recent
buyers for comparably equipped automobiles. Actual prices are the result of
arms-length negotiations between willing buyers and sellers, and thus reflect
what you can expect to pay (on average) when you negotiate your automobile
purchase. The list (“sticker”) price is just a suggested retail price—the actual
negotiated price is often considerably less (but sometimes can be more) than
the manufacturer’s list price.
Requirement 2:
The Blue Book price of $19,500 is less representationally faithful than the
manufacturer’s list price. To understand why, notice that recent selling prices
have ranged from $18,000 to $22,000. This means that while you can expect
to pay $19,500 on average for the automobile, it may cost you as little as
$18,000 or as much as $22,000. On the other hand, there is little (if any)
variation in the manufacturer’s list price—comparably equipped cars have
essentially the same list price.
In this setting, reliability refers to price variation and there is more variation
(less reliability) in the underlying Blue Book prices than there is in the
manufacturer’s list price.
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P1-7. Accounting Information Characteristics (LO 1-1)
Requirement 1:
“Cash” and “Net accounts receivable” are both relevant to the loan decision
because they provide information about cash flows and thus about the
company’s ability to make principal and interest payments as they come due.
The balance in “Accumulated depreciation”, on the other hand, says nothing
about the company’s current or future cash. Consequently, this information is
not relevant to the loan decision.
Requirement 2:
“Cash” is the most representationally faithful balance sheet item. The
amount of cash on hand and in the bank at a particular moment in time can
be determined with a high degree of accuracy. “Net accounts receivable” is
less so because its determination requires estimates of future sales returns
and bad debts. These estimates, which are essential to the accounting
process, reduce the faithful representation of this balance sheet item.
“Accumulated depreciation” is also less representationally faithful than “Cash”
because its measurement requires estimates of salvage (residual) value and
useful life.
P1-8. Accounting Conservatism (LO 1-1)
Requirement 1:
Accounting conservatism requires that the land now be shown on the balance
sheet at the lower amount $3 million, its estimated fair market value, rather
that at the $5 million you paid two months ago. Conservatism is the practice
of recording possible losses—in this case, the decline in value of the land—
as soon as they become probable and measurable.
Requirement 2:
Accounting conservatism requires that the land continue to be shown on the
balance sheet at the price paid two months ago ($3 million) rather than the
higher estimated fair value ($5 million). Conservatism records losses as soon
as they are probable and measurable, but additional requirements must be
met to record gains (as you will soon discover in Chapter 2).
Requirement 1:
“Cash” and “Net accounts receivable” are both relevant to the loan decision
because they provide information about cash flows and thus about the
company’s ability to make principal and interest payments as they come due.
The balance in “Accumulated depreciation”, on the other hand, says nothing
about the company’s current or future cash. Consequently, this information is
not relevant to the loan decision.
Requirement 2:
“Cash” is the most representationally faithful balance sheet item. The
amount of cash on hand and in the bank at a particular moment in time can
be determined with a high degree of accuracy. “Net accounts receivable” is
less so because its determination requires estimates of future sales returns
and bad debts. These estimates, which are essential to the accounting
process, reduce the faithful representation of this balance sheet item.
“Accumulated depreciation” is also less representationally faithful than “Cash”
because its measurement requires estimates of salvage (residual) value and
useful life.
P1-8. Accounting Conservatism (LO 1-1)
Requirement 1:
Accounting conservatism requires that the land now be shown on the balance
sheet at the lower amount $3 million, its estimated fair market value, rather
that at the $5 million you paid two months ago. Conservatism is the practice
of recording possible losses—in this case, the decline in value of the land—
as soon as they become probable and measurable.
Requirement 2:
Accounting conservatism requires that the land continue to be shown on the
balance sheet at the price paid two months ago ($3 million) rather than the
higher estimated fair value ($5 million). Conservatism records losses as soon
as they are probable and measurable, but additional requirements must be
met to record gains (as you will soon discover in Chapter 2).
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P1-9. Factors Affecting Financial Reporting (LO 1-2, LO 1-3, LO 1-4)
1) Accounting is not an exact science. One reason this is the case is that
many financial statement numbers are based on estimates of future
conditions (e.g., future bad debts and warranty claims). Another reason is that
there is no single accounting method that is best for all companies and
situations. Thus, different companies use different methods to account for
similar transactions (e.g., depreciation of property and the valuation of
inventory).
2) While some managers may select accounting methods that produce the
most accurate picture of a company’s performance and condition, other
managers may make financial reporting decisions that are self-serving and
strategic. Consider the following examples:
Managers who receive a bonus based on reported earnings or return on
equity may make financial reporting decisions that accelerate revenue
recognition and delay expense recognition in order to maximize the
present value of their bonus payments.
Managers who must adhere to limits on financial accounting ratios in debt
covenants may make reporting decisions designed to avoid violation of
these contracts.
More generally, managers are likely to make financial reporting decisions
that portray them in a good light.
The moral is that financial analysts should approach financial statements with
some skepticism because management has tremendous influence over the
reported numbers.
3) This is probably true. Financial accounting is a slave to many masters.
Many different constituencies have a stake in financial accounting and
reporting practices—existing shareholders, prospective shareholders,
financial analysts, managers, employees, lenders, suppliers, customers,
unions, government agencies, shareholder activist groups, and politicians.
The amount and type of information that each group demands is likely to be
different. As a result, accounting standards in the United States reflect the
outcome of a process where each constituency tries to advance its interests.
Examples illustrating the politics of accounting standards are interspersed
throughout this book.
4) This is false. Even without mandatory disclosure rules by the FASB and
SEC, companies have incentives to voluntarily disclose information that helps
them obtain debt and equity financing at the lowest possible cost. Failure to
do so results in higher cost of debt and equity capital.
1) Accounting is not an exact science. One reason this is the case is that
many financial statement numbers are based on estimates of future
conditions (e.g., future bad debts and warranty claims). Another reason is that
there is no single accounting method that is best for all companies and
situations. Thus, different companies use different methods to account for
similar transactions (e.g., depreciation of property and the valuation of
inventory).
2) While some managers may select accounting methods that produce the
most accurate picture of a company’s performance and condition, other
managers may make financial reporting decisions that are self-serving and
strategic. Consider the following examples:
Managers who receive a bonus based on reported earnings or return on
equity may make financial reporting decisions that accelerate revenue
recognition and delay expense recognition in order to maximize the
present value of their bonus payments.
Managers who must adhere to limits on financial accounting ratios in debt
covenants may make reporting decisions designed to avoid violation of
these contracts.
More generally, managers are likely to make financial reporting decisions
that portray them in a good light.
The moral is that financial analysts should approach financial statements with
some skepticism because management has tremendous influence over the
reported numbers.
3) This is probably true. Financial accounting is a slave to many masters.
Many different constituencies have a stake in financial accounting and
reporting practices—existing shareholders, prospective shareholders,
financial analysts, managers, employees, lenders, suppliers, customers,
unions, government agencies, shareholder activist groups, and politicians.
The amount and type of information that each group demands is likely to be
different. As a result, accounting standards in the United States reflect the
outcome of a process where each constituency tries to advance its interests.
Examples illustrating the politics of accounting standards are interspersed
throughout this book.
4) This is false. Even without mandatory disclosure rules by the FASB and
SEC, companies have incentives to voluntarily disclose information that helps
them obtain debt and equity financing at the lowest possible cost. Failure to
do so results in higher cost of debt and equity capital.
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5) This is true. If the information is value-relevant—meaning, important for
investors to know—there is no obvious reason not to disclose the information
except when doing so places the company at a competitive disadvantage.
6) The best response is that the statement is false because:
Managers have incentives to develop and maintain a good relationship
with financial analysts. Failing to disclose value-relevant information (good
or bad) on a timely basis can damage this relationship.
Under the U.S. securities laws, shareholders can sue managers for failing
to disclose material financial information on a timely basis. To reduce
potential legal liability under shareholder lawsuits, managers have
incentives to disclose even bad news in a timely manner.
7) This may be true or false. If a company discloses so little information that
investors and lenders cannot adequately assess the expected return and risk
of its securities, then its cost of capital will be high. In this case, managers are
doing shareholders a disservice by not disclosing more information to
financial markets. If, on the other hand, increased disclosure harms the
company’s competitive advantage, managers have helped shareholders.
investors to know—there is no obvious reason not to disclose the information
except when doing so places the company at a competitive disadvantage.
6) The best response is that the statement is false because:
Managers have incentives to develop and maintain a good relationship
with financial analysts. Failing to disclose value-relevant information (good
or bad) on a timely basis can damage this relationship.
Under the U.S. securities laws, shareholders can sue managers for failing
to disclose material financial information on a timely basis. To reduce
potential legal liability under shareholder lawsuits, managers have
incentives to disclose even bad news in a timely manner.
7) This may be true or false. If a company discloses so little information that
investors and lenders cannot adequately assess the expected return and risk
of its securities, then its cost of capital will be high. In this case, managers are
doing shareholders a disservice by not disclosing more information to
financial markets. If, on the other hand, increased disclosure harms the
company’s competitive advantage, managers have helped shareholders.
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P1-10. Economic Consequences of Accounting Standards (LO 1-3)
Requirement 1:
There are several economic consequences that could arise when companies
are forced to alter their past accounting methods—in this case, by recording a
new liability and corresponding expense.
Mandatory changes in accounting methods of this sort can disrupt contracts
that are defined in terms of accounting ratios. One example is a loan
agreement that restricts the firm from exceeding some maximum debt-to-
equity ratio. The accounting change will add additional dollars to debt and
simultaneously subtract dollars from equity, and thus may cause the firm to
violate its lending agreement. The costs associated with violating the
agreement represent an economic consequence of the accounting change.
In response to the possibility of violating the loan agreement, management
may decide to sell some otherwise productive assets. The cash raised could
then be used to pay down debt, and the accounting gain would increase
reported equity. This would soften the adverse effect of the accounting
change on the company’s debt-to-equity ratio. But notice that the asset sale is
occurring only in response to the accounting change—and thus it too
represents an economic consequence of the change.
And, as described in requirement 2, management may decide to reduce or
curtail employee healthcare benefits so that the recorded liability (and
expense) is as small as possible. This benefit reduction becomes an
economic consequence borne by employees of the company.
Requirement 2:
There are widely divergent views on whether the FASB should consider the
economic consequences of its actions when formulating accounting
standards.
On the one hand, SFAC No.2 states that “neutrality” is a desired
characteristic of financial statement information. Neutrality means that the
information cannot be selected to favor one set of interested parties over
another. So, real liabilities cannot remain unrecorded just because recording
them may cause some firms to violate their lending agreements. When
applied to the standard setting process, neutrality means that the FASB
should ignore the economic consequences of alternative accounting
practices.
A more practical problem is that it is exceedingly difficult to quantify those
consequences in any meaningful way. How can the FASB determine which
Requirement 1:
There are several economic consequences that could arise when companies
are forced to alter their past accounting methods—in this case, by recording a
new liability and corresponding expense.
Mandatory changes in accounting methods of this sort can disrupt contracts
that are defined in terms of accounting ratios. One example is a loan
agreement that restricts the firm from exceeding some maximum debt-to-
equity ratio. The accounting change will add additional dollars to debt and
simultaneously subtract dollars from equity, and thus may cause the firm to
violate its lending agreement. The costs associated with violating the
agreement represent an economic consequence of the accounting change.
In response to the possibility of violating the loan agreement, management
may decide to sell some otherwise productive assets. The cash raised could
then be used to pay down debt, and the accounting gain would increase
reported equity. This would soften the adverse effect of the accounting
change on the company’s debt-to-equity ratio. But notice that the asset sale is
occurring only in response to the accounting change—and thus it too
represents an economic consequence of the change.
And, as described in requirement 2, management may decide to reduce or
curtail employee healthcare benefits so that the recorded liability (and
expense) is as small as possible. This benefit reduction becomes an
economic consequence borne by employees of the company.
Requirement 2:
There are widely divergent views on whether the FASB should consider the
economic consequences of its actions when formulating accounting
standards.
On the one hand, SFAC No.2 states that “neutrality” is a desired
characteristic of financial statement information. Neutrality means that the
information cannot be selected to favor one set of interested parties over
another. So, real liabilities cannot remain unrecorded just because recording
them may cause some firms to violate their lending agreements. When
applied to the standard setting process, neutrality means that the FASB
should ignore the economic consequences of alternative accounting
practices.
A more practical problem is that it is exceedingly difficult to quantify those
consequences in any meaningful way. How can the FASB determine which
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firms will likely violate their lending agreements or what it will cost them if they
do so? And what about the economic consequences of likely changes in
management’s actions (e.g., asset sale, reduced employee benefits, etc.)?
Even if the FASB was able to quantify all of the potential consequences
associated with a particular proposed accounting change, it would still face
the gargantuan task of deciding whether the total benefits outweighed the
total costs to the various parties involved. For example, should lenders be
favored and employees harmed by requiring heath care liabilities to be shown
on the balance sheet? Or, should lenders be harmed and employees favored
by keeping health care liabilities off the balance sheet?
Of course, the interested parties themselves fervently believe the FASB
should consider the economic consequences of alternative accounting
practices when formulating standards. To do otherwise, they argue, is to
ignore a simple fact that mandatory accounting changes sometimes have real
consequences.
do so? And what about the economic consequences of likely changes in
management’s actions (e.g., asset sale, reduced employee benefits, etc.)?
Even if the FASB was able to quantify all of the potential consequences
associated with a particular proposed accounting change, it would still face
the gargantuan task of deciding whether the total benefits outweighed the
total costs to the various parties involved. For example, should lenders be
favored and employees harmed by requiring heath care liabilities to be shown
on the balance sheet? Or, should lenders be harmed and employees favored
by keeping health care liabilities off the balance sheet?
Of course, the interested parties themselves fervently believe the FASB
should consider the economic consequences of alternative accounting
practices when formulating standards. To do otherwise, they argue, is to
ignore a simple fact that mandatory accounting changes sometimes have real
consequences.
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