Solution Manual For Principles of Managerial Finance, 8th Edition
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n Ch. 1 Answers to Review Questions
1-1. The goal of a firm, and therefore of all financial managers, is maximizing shareholder wealth.
The proper metric for this goal is the price of the firm’s stock. Other things equal, an
increasing price per share of common stock relative to the stock market as a whole indicates
achievement of this goal.
1-2 Actions that maximize the firm’s current profit may not produce the highest stock price
because (1) some firm activities that result in slightly lower profit today generate much larger
profits in the future periods (i.e., focusing on current profit overlooks the time value of
money); (2) activities that generate higher accounting profits today may not result in higher
cash flows to stockholders; and (3) activities that lead to high profits today may involve higher
risk, which could result in significant future losses.
1-3 Risk is the chance actual outcomes may differ from expected outcomes. Financial managers
must consider risk and return because the two factors tend to have an opposite effect on share
price. That is, other things equal, an increase in the risk of cash flows to shareholders will
depress firm stock price while higher average cash flows to shareholders will increase stock
price.
1-4 Maximizing shareholder wealth does not mean overlooking or minimizing the welfare of other
firm stakeholders. Firms with satisfied employees, customers, and suppliers tend to produce
higher (or less risky) cash flows for their shareholders compared with companies that neglect
non-owner stakeholders. That said, customers prefer lower prices for firm output, firm
employees prefer higher wages, and firm suppliers prefer higher prices for the input goods and
services they provide. So actions that produce the highest price of the firm’s stock cannot
simultaneously maximize customer, employee, and supplier satisfaction.
1-5 Broadly speaking, the decisions made by financial managers fall under three headings: (i)
investment, (ii) capital budgeting, and (iii) working capital. Investment decisions involve the
firm’s long-term projects while financing decisions concern the funding of those projects.
Working-capital decisions, in contrast are related to the firm’s management of short-term
financial resources.
1-6 Financial managers must recognize the tradeoff between risk and return because shareholders
prefer higher cash flows but dislike large swings in cash flows. And, as a general rule, actions
that boost the firm’s average cash flows also result in greater cash-flow greater volatility.
Viewed another way, firm actions to reduce the chance cash flows will be low or negative also
tend to reduce average cash flows over time. Understanding this tradeoff is important because
shareholders are risk averse. That is, they will only accept larger swings in a firm’s cash flows
only if compensated over time with higher average cash flows.
1-7 Finance is often considered applied economics. One reason is firms operate within the larger
economy. More importantly, the bedrock concept in economics—marginal benefit-marginal
cost analysis—is also central to managerial finance. Marginal benefit-marginal cost analysis is
the notion a firm (or any other economic actor) should take only those actions for which the
extra benefits exceed the extra costs. Nearly, all financial decisions ultimately turn on an
assessment of their marginal benefits and marginal costs.
1-1. The goal of a firm, and therefore of all financial managers, is maximizing shareholder wealth.
The proper metric for this goal is the price of the firm’s stock. Other things equal, an
increasing price per share of common stock relative to the stock market as a whole indicates
achievement of this goal.
1-2 Actions that maximize the firm’s current profit may not produce the highest stock price
because (1) some firm activities that result in slightly lower profit today generate much larger
profits in the future periods (i.e., focusing on current profit overlooks the time value of
money); (2) activities that generate higher accounting profits today may not result in higher
cash flows to stockholders; and (3) activities that lead to high profits today may involve higher
risk, which could result in significant future losses.
1-3 Risk is the chance actual outcomes may differ from expected outcomes. Financial managers
must consider risk and return because the two factors tend to have an opposite effect on share
price. That is, other things equal, an increase in the risk of cash flows to shareholders will
depress firm stock price while higher average cash flows to shareholders will increase stock
price.
1-4 Maximizing shareholder wealth does not mean overlooking or minimizing the welfare of other
firm stakeholders. Firms with satisfied employees, customers, and suppliers tend to produce
higher (or less risky) cash flows for their shareholders compared with companies that neglect
non-owner stakeholders. That said, customers prefer lower prices for firm output, firm
employees prefer higher wages, and firm suppliers prefer higher prices for the input goods and
services they provide. So actions that produce the highest price of the firm’s stock cannot
simultaneously maximize customer, employee, and supplier satisfaction.
1-5 Broadly speaking, the decisions made by financial managers fall under three headings: (i)
investment, (ii) capital budgeting, and (iii) working capital. Investment decisions involve the
firm’s long-term projects while financing decisions concern the funding of those projects.
Working-capital decisions, in contrast are related to the firm’s management of short-term
financial resources.
1-6 Financial managers must recognize the tradeoff between risk and return because shareholders
prefer higher cash flows but dislike large swings in cash flows. And, as a general rule, actions
that boost the firm’s average cash flows also result in greater cash-flow greater volatility.
Viewed another way, firm actions to reduce the chance cash flows will be low or negative also
tend to reduce average cash flows over time. Understanding this tradeoff is important because
shareholders are risk averse. That is, they will only accept larger swings in a firm’s cash flows
only if compensated over time with higher average cash flows.
1-7 Finance is often considered applied economics. One reason is firms operate within the larger
economy. More importantly, the bedrock concept in economics—marginal benefit-marginal
cost analysis—is also central to managerial finance. Marginal benefit-marginal cost analysis is
the notion a firm (or any other economic actor) should take only those actions for which the
extra benefits exceed the extra costs. Nearly, all financial decisions ultimately turn on an
assessment of their marginal benefits and marginal costs.
1-8 Accountants and financial managers perform separate but equally important functions for the
firm. Accountants primarily collect and present financial data according to generally accepted
financial principles while financial managers make investment, capital-budgeting, and
working-capital decisions with financial data. In part because of their different functions,
accountants and financial managers log firm revenues and expenses using different
conventions. Accountants operate on an accrual basis, recognizing revenues as firm output is
sold (whether or not payment is actually received) and firm expenses as incurred. Financial
managers, in contrast, focus on actual inflows and outflows of cash, recognizing revenues
when physically received and expenses when actually paid.
1-9 Like any economic actor, managers respond to incentives. Managers have a fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder wealth, but as humans, they also have personal goals—such as
maximizing their own income, wealth, reputation, and quality of life. If the personal benefits
of delivering for shareholders (or the costs of slighting them) are small, a financial manager
might opt to further his own interest at the expense of shareholders. For example, CEOs of
large firms—those with more sales, assets, employees, etc.—tend to receive more
compensation than CEOs of smaller firms. If a CEO has to choose between two operating
strategies—one that produces modest growth for his firm but a large jump in current stock
price and another that generates rapid growth but a more modest rise in share price—and the
firm’s board is not closely monitoring the CEO, she might pursue the high-growth strategy to
boost her future compensation. A partial solution to such a problem is a compensation closely
linking CEO compensation to firm stock price.
1-10 Sole proprietorships are the most common form of business organization, while corporations
tend to be the largest. Large firms tend to organize as corporations to insulate owners from
losses (limit liability) and facilitate acquisition of financial capital to fund growth.
1-11 Stockholders are the owners of a corporation. Their ownership (equity) takes the form of
common stock or, less frequently, preferred stock. Stockholders elect the board of directors,
which has ultimate responsibility for guiding corporate affairs and setting general policy. The
board usually comprises key corporate personnel and outside directors. The corporation’s
president or chief executive officer (CEO) reports to the board. He or she oversees day-to-day
operations subject to the general policies established by the board. The corporation’s owners
(shareholders) do not have a direct relationship with management; they provide input by
electing board members and voting on major charter issues. Shareholders receive
compensation in two forms: (i) dividends paid on their stock (from corporate earnings) and (ii)
capital gains from increases in the price of their shares (which reflect market expectations
about future dividends).
1-12 Generally speaking, income from sole proprietorships and partnerships is taxed only once at
the individual level; the owner or owners pay personal income tax on their share of firm’s
profits. In contrast, corporate income is taxed first at the firm level (via the corporate income
tax paid on firm profits) and then again at the personal level (via personal income tax paid on
dividends or capital gains enjoyed by shareholders).
firm. Accountants primarily collect and present financial data according to generally accepted
financial principles while financial managers make investment, capital-budgeting, and
working-capital decisions with financial data. In part because of their different functions,
accountants and financial managers log firm revenues and expenses using different
conventions. Accountants operate on an accrual basis, recognizing revenues as firm output is
sold (whether or not payment is actually received) and firm expenses as incurred. Financial
managers, in contrast, focus on actual inflows and outflows of cash, recognizing revenues
when physically received and expenses when actually paid.
1-9 Like any economic actor, managers respond to incentives. Managers have a fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder wealth, but as humans, they also have personal goals—such as
maximizing their own income, wealth, reputation, and quality of life. If the personal benefits
of delivering for shareholders (or the costs of slighting them) are small, a financial manager
might opt to further his own interest at the expense of shareholders. For example, CEOs of
large firms—those with more sales, assets, employees, etc.—tend to receive more
compensation than CEOs of smaller firms. If a CEO has to choose between two operating
strategies—one that produces modest growth for his firm but a large jump in current stock
price and another that generates rapid growth but a more modest rise in share price—and the
firm’s board is not closely monitoring the CEO, she might pursue the high-growth strategy to
boost her future compensation. A partial solution to such a problem is a compensation closely
linking CEO compensation to firm stock price.
1-10 Sole proprietorships are the most common form of business organization, while corporations
tend to be the largest. Large firms tend to organize as corporations to insulate owners from
losses (limit liability) and facilitate acquisition of financial capital to fund growth.
1-11 Stockholders are the owners of a corporation. Their ownership (equity) takes the form of
common stock or, less frequently, preferred stock. Stockholders elect the board of directors,
which has ultimate responsibility for guiding corporate affairs and setting general policy. The
board usually comprises key corporate personnel and outside directors. The corporation’s
president or chief executive officer (CEO) reports to the board. He or she oversees day-to-day
operations subject to the general policies established by the board. The corporation’s owners
(shareholders) do not have a direct relationship with management; they provide input by
electing board members and voting on major charter issues. Shareholders receive
compensation in two forms: (i) dividends paid on their stock (from corporate earnings) and (ii)
capital gains from increases in the price of their shares (which reflect market expectations
about future dividends).
1-12 Generally speaking, income from sole proprietorships and partnerships is taxed only once at
the individual level; the owner or owners pay personal income tax on their share of firm’s
profits. In contrast, corporate income is taxed first at the firm level (via the corporate income
tax paid on firm profits) and then again at the personal level (via personal income tax paid on
dividends or capital gains enjoyed by shareholders).
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